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Incorporating Policymaker Costs and 
Political Competition into 
Rent-Seeking Games 
R. Kenneth Godwin,* Edward J. L6pez,t and Barry J. Seldont 
We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among 
rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater 
verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests 
there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact 
that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that 
lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competi­
tion and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, if the value of the rent is 
sufficiently high relative to policymakers' costs, an increase in the intensity of political competition 
will increase lobbying expenditures; otheiWise, expenditures fall as competitive intensity increa..es. In 
addition, the model establishes pure-strategy equilibria with underdissipation where only mixed­
strategy equilibria exist in the standard model. 
JEL Classification: 072, H42, LSI 
L Introduction 
Rent seeking in politics involves agents who lobby policymakers for potential benefits. In a 
seminal contribution, Tullock ( 1980) modeled rent seeking as a lottery game. A major weakness of 
Tullock's game was that it lacked verisimilitude to actual rent seeking because it omitted politics. The 
absence of politics meant that the game essentially assumed that there are no costs to the policymakers 
of supplying rents. But as Tollison (1997) and others have pointed out, these costs are not zero, and 
the politics surrounding the policy decision influence the pattern of lobbying and the rent-seeking 
outcome. In this paper we address two aspects of those politics: the costs to policymakers of supplying 
rents and the variable intensity of political competition among a given number of rent seekers. 
Including these aspects increases the similarity of the game to actual rent-seeking situations and 
makes clearer the incentives to rent seekers. 
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Costs to supplying rents arise due to various constraints. Legislators must build coalitions, acquire 
parliamentary rights, maintain a positive image, and service constituent interests. Policymakers in 
agencies must follow procedural rules, submit to congressional oversight and budgeting, pass OMB 
reviews, and so forth. Lower policymaker costs should increase the effectiveness of lobbying, and this 
should attract greater lobbying efforts among rent seekers. 1 Increasing policymaker costs makes 
lobbying less effective. Indeed, because of these costs policymakers often tum away lobbies empty­
handed. In short, policymakers have constraints that affect the policies they design, and this affects 
lobbying expenditures (Dougan and Snyder !993). This paper introduces policymaker costs in 
monetary units, such that they are comparable to the value of the rent and rent-seeking expenditures. 
Political competition among rent seekers also influences the rent-seeking outcome. Competition 
traditionally has been modeled by varying the number of rent-seeking agents (actual or potential) or 
their relative lobbying expenditures (e.g., Posner 1975; Rogerson 1982; Sun and Ng 1999). Com­
petition can vary, however, even among a given number of rent seekers and for a given profile of 
expenditures. For example, two agents may lobby a policymaker for the same unique and exclusive 
political good. Then one agent directly opposes the other and only one agent can win the good. 
Alternatively, the same two agents may lobby a policymaker for two separate political goods. In that 
case, the agents oppose each other only indirectly. This situation is frequent in politics as rent-seeking 
agents compete for space on the political agenda, for policymakers' time, and for portions of a 
particular government budget. In this situation, success by one agent does not necessarily result in 
failure by the other, but it does lower the probability that the other agent will succeed. Competition 
is more intense in the first example, even though the examples involve the same number of firms. 
Industrial organization economists have shown that a single parameter can determine incumbent 
firms' competition in price and quantity regardless of the number of firms present.2 This paper 
IFI introduces rent-seeking competition analogously, allowing a parameter to alter the competitiveness 
of the rent-seeking game among a fixed number of firms. 
We incorporate monetized policymaker costs and the political competition parameter into the 
success probabilities of the standard rent-seeking game. The resulting model is a game in which the 
agents' simultaneous maximization of expected net returns (or profits) determines a Nash equilibrium 
in their expenditures. Incorporating politics into the standard game makes the game more accurate 
because equilibrium and comparative statics depend in part on the politics of the rent-seeking contest. 
More specifically, increasing political competition decreases rent-seeking expenditures unless the 
value of the rent is sufficiently large relative to policymaker costs; and dissipation rates are lower than 
in previous research because of policymaker costs. Furthermore, under increasing returns to 
expenditures there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium with underdissipation of rents, unlike the 
standard game, which has stochastic mixed-strategy equilibria with overdissipation occurring about 
half the time. 
Intuitively, in the model incorporating politics, rent seekers will avoid competition with each 
other, search for low-cost providers of political goods, and generally avoid overdissipation. With such 
implications, our model extends the Tullock game in a political-economic sense, reaching more 
empirically reasonable results than previous models. 
1 Organized interests concentrate campaign contributions on legislators with greater parliamentary power over lheir issue set 
(Grier and Munger 1991; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998). 
1 The magnitude of a single variable, the conjectural variation, determines whether two firms act as if they are competitive firms, 
pricing at marginal cost, or if they act a~ a cartel, maximizing their profits a<> would a multiplant monopolist (see Waterson 1984 
for a concise discussion). 
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2. The Standard Rent-Seeking Model3 
Following Tullock (1980), consider two agents competing for a private good with expenditures 
and R2 and success probabilities R1 
Rcr 
p - I and1 ~Rf+R]. 
where P1 + P 2 = I, which implies that one agent must wm. cr indicates ··returns to scale" in 
expenditures; for example, if cr > l, then an increase in R;, ceteris paribus. causes a more than 
proportionate increase in agent i's probability of winning.4 If cr is the same for both agents, then the 
game is '"unbiased": the agents are equally suited to rent seeking. Tullock reasoned that if cr = 2 and 
n= 2 in an unbiased game, then combined symmetric expenditures would equal the value of the prize. 
Following convention, we call this "exact dissipation." But if cr > 2 for two agents (or cr > n/(n - I) 
for n agents), Tullock reasoned that total spending in an unbiased game will always exceed the value 
of the rent, and this usually will occur in biased games. This result is "overdissipation" and forms the 
basis of Tullock's social waste argument. 
Many game theorists were attracted to Tullock's curious result, and most of the rent-seeking 
models that followed attempted to rule out overdissipation in equilibrium. New contributions emerged 
with increasing complexities, such as open-ended sequential games, uncertain prizes, risk-averse rent 
seekers, budget constraints, entry conditions, and various sharing rules for groups of winners. As 
a consequence, this literature formalized and generalized Tullock's reasoning. 5 By incorporating 
policymaker costs and political competition into the basic model, this paper formalizes the idea that rent 
seeking takes place within a political context that influences patterns of rent seeking and the outcomes 
observed (Tollison 1997). The model suggests a more politically realistic solution to overdissipation. 
3. Rent Seeking with Policymaker Costs and Political Competition 
In previous formulations of rent-seeking contests, players' success probabilities are related only· 
to their relative lobbying expenditures, regardless of the value of cr. It has been noted in several places 
(e.g., Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries 1994: Che and Gale 1997) that if cr is finite, then the game is 
a lottery: and if cr ~ oo, then the game is an all-pay auction. For any finite value of cr, the chances of 
player i's success increase directly with expenditures R;. In the lottery, the winner is selected 
according to probabilities; in the all-pay auction the winner is the highest bidder. Such an approach 
assumes a costless political process. In contrast, define N E (O,x) as the monetized disutility to the 
policymaker of providing the rent. Thus conceived, the policymakers' costs may be influenced by any 
number of institutional factors. For instance, N may depend on the political body that is lobbied. For 
middle-level regulatory waivers, there may be a small number of policymakers involved, little formal 
oversight, and negligible lobbying opposition-in this case N may be close to zero. Alternatively, for 
major legislative changes in which a winning coalition must form against powerful opposition and 
-'We refer to the class of games that follow the approach based on Tullock's (1980) lottery game as the ·•standard model." We 
do not intend to implicate other branches of the literature that have incorporated politics such as the theory of regulation (Stigler 
1971; Peltzman l 976; McConnick and Tollison 1981; Becker 1983) or various empirical approaches that are too numerous to 
list here (Tollison 1997 provides an up-to-date survey). 
4 
a does not indicate returns to scale as u!.ually defined, but we maintain this tenninology of the literature. 
~For a compilation of this literature, see Lockard and Tullock (2001). 
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re-election constraints, N may be very high. Policymaker costs also could depend on the selection of 
a voting rule-majority rule would have a lower N than would a supermajority rule. Stronger checks 
and balances also affect policymaker costs: for U.S. style judicial review, N may be moderate, but for 
Swiss style legislative referendum, N may be much higher (Moser 2000; Spindler and de Vanssay 
2003). Individual policymakers can have different values of N, depending on their regulatory/ 
parliamentary power over a policy (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier and Munger 1991 ). Public 
perception may help to determine N if it involves a policy that would attract substantial negative 
media attention to the policymaker(s). 
Consider next the nature of competition among rent seekers. It may depend on the number of 
rent seekers and entry conditions, as demonstrated in many contributions to both the empirical and 
theoretical rent-seeking literature. However, political competition can also emerge among a given 
number of rent seekers. For example, two firms may compete for a single contract to produce tires for 
government vehicles. If only one firm can receive the contract, the success of a firm completely 
precludes the success of its rival. In this case, political competition is high. In contrast, suppose 
two defense contractors are lobbying to increase the price each receives for weapons sold to the 
government. If one firm's success in obtaining a price increase has little impact on the probability that 
the other firm will also obtain an increase, then political competition is low. If, however, policymakers 
face a tight budget constraint, then one firm's success can significantly affect the other firm's 
probability of obtaining its objective, and the competition between them is higher. Nevertheless, 
competition would be less than between firms bidding for the same rent if only one can succeed. To 
introduce this concept of political competition into the model, we define a: E (0, I] as an index of 
competition that increases with the degree of competition in the contest. 
For the moment, suppose that there are two players, Finn I and Firm 2, which incur expenditures 
R1 and R2 in lobbying to acquire a rent of value V to each firm, and that cr = 1.
6 We express the 
probabilities of success or failure for Finn i, where i = l, 2 and, in the following, i-F j, as 
R 
P, = R ~ = probability that Finn i receives the good; (l)
'+ i+N 
l - P, = a.Ri + N = probability that Firm i fails to receive the good, (2)
R, + a.Ri +N 
where it is possible that neither firm will succeed, and where C1. represents the degree of competition 
between the rent seekers. If C1. < I, there are four possible ex-post states of the world: ( l) both firms 
may succeed in their lobbying; (2) both firms may fail; (3) Firm I may succeed and Firm 2 may fail; 
and (4) Finn l may fail and Finn 2 may succeed. The competition parameter C1. signifies the 
importance to Firm i of Finnj's lobbying expenditures. The higher C1. is, the more Firmj's expenditure 
reduces Finn i's probability of success. At the upper bound, if C1. = I and Finn i succeeds, then Finn 
j will fail. Here there are three possible outcomes: (I) Firm I may win, in which case Firm 2 fails; 
(2) Firm 2 may win, so Firm I fails; and (3) both firms may fail. 7 When C1. = I, the expenditure of a firm 
that increases its probability of success has a very deleterious effect on the other finn's probability of 
winning. In contrast, if one firm's success does not preclude the other firm's success, a. takes a value 
6 Different vaJuations of the rent to the two finns are plausible but would not change our main results. We discuss the 
implications of different valuations below. Similarly, we consider different values of a below, 
7 	If tx = 1, we have an e;\tension of the standard game because, in that case, probability (2) is the sum of the probability that Finn j 
receives the good, expressed as Rj(R, + R1 +N), and the probability that neither finn receives the rent, expressed as N/(R; +Rj+ 
N). Adding the probability that Finn i receives the rent, expressed as Rj(R; +R1 +N), we have three probabilities that sum to one. 
Allematively, if tx < I, each firm has a prohability of success and a probability of failure. In this case, there are four probabilities. 
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tess than I. For lower values of ex, !he probability of Firm i's success is higher for any given R1. At the 
lower bound, if ex= 0, there is no effect at all of one finn's expenditures on the other finn's success 
probability: because ex= 0 the rival's term disappears from the probability equations. Because we are 
interested in rent-seeking competition, however, we bound ex away from 0. 
Obviously, Probabilities (I) and (2) sum to one and each firm's success probability increases as the 
firm spends more. These features carry over from the standard game. For any N > 0, P; and P1 are less 
than one; thus there is a positive probability that neither firm wins the rent. For an increase inN, there is 
a decrease in the probability of each firm's success and, therefore, an increase in the probability that 
neither wins. Finally, the standard game is a special case of our model, in which ex= I and N = 0. 
4. The Model 
We model two agents (viz., firms) in a simultaneous game. The firms maximize expected net 
returns from lobbying, which we refer to simply as "profits." Let V > 0 be the value of the rent to the 
finn. For now, we assume these benefits to be equal for both firms so that their problems are identical. 
We also assume that the firms are equally adept at lobbying. Thus, for i,j= !, 2 each firm maximizes 
expected profits, the difference between expected returns and the cost of lobbying, by 
max = R 
1 V -R· (3)
R, II, [R,. + aRj + Nl I! 
where the expenditure terms are linear. We need only include the probability of the firm succeeding in 
lobbying in expected profits. Thus Equation 3 expresses the expected profit in the less competitive 
case, where CJ. E (0, 1), as well as in the highly competitive case, where CJ. =I, so 01 E (0, !], despite the 
different numbers of ex-post states of the world. The first-order condition equates marginal expected 
returns to marginal cost, so 
8[!; = [ cxRJ+N ]v I-0 (4)
8R; (R; + cxR +N) 2 - - • 
1 
The second derivative is negative, so the solution to Equation 4 maximizes protits. 8 Of course, if 
the value of V were small enough relative to political costs N, then firms would not lobby. We make 
the following 
AssUMITION I: V > N. 
This will be sufficient to ensure that the firms have the incentive to make expenditures in seeking 
the rent. 
Equation 4 implicitly yields the profit-maximizing level of R;; and defining the set containing any 
R; 2 0 that satisfies profit maximization as the firm's best reply, p;, results in the best reply function 
.j(cxR +N)V- cxR -N for 0 < R < (V-N) - 1 - ClPi = J Q I (5){ for (V-N) < R 
' 1 
The proof that Equation 5 is the best reply function is in Appendix A. There, we show that IT; 2 0 on 
Equation 5, so the profit-maximizing finn does not incur an expected loss on the best reply function, 
H The ~econd derivative is -{2(':XR1 + N)/[(R; + 'lR1 + N)
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and that the best reply function is strictly concave over Rj :::; (V - N)/r:J., which is useful later in 
establishing equilibrium. 
In Appendix B we show that the exact shape of Firm i's best reply function depends on the value
of V relative toN. For V:::; 4N (so the value of the rent is relatively small compared with policymakers'
costs), Pi is monotonically decreasing in Rj, and the firm would reduce lobbying expenditures as its
rival's expenditures increase; in essence acquiescing to its rival because the rent is not worth the fight. 
But if V > 4N, then Pi has an interior maximum at Rj = (V/4- N)/r:J., so if the rent is relatively valuable
there is a range over lower levels of the rival's expenditures in which the finn's expenditures increase
with that of its rival's. The firm is willing to challenge the rival to gain the relatively valuable rent.9 
Because the shape of Pi depends on the relative values of V toN, equilibrium also depends on the
relative values. In Appendix C, we provide existence and uniqueness proofs for the equilibrium when
V :::; 4N. 10 For all V > 4N, there likely exists a unique equilibrium, but we can only prove uniqueness
for 4[(1 + a)/r:J.] 2N > V > 4N. It is possible that three equilibria might exist if Vis even larger than
4[(1 + r:J.)/r:J.] 2N, but we have been unable to construct a numerical example of such a game, and we
doubt that one exists. Examples of best reply functions and equilibria are shown in Figure I, where
Figure lA has V < 4N, Figure lB has 4[(1 + a)/a]2N > V > 4N, and Figure lC has V > 4[(1 + r:J.)/
r:J.]2N > 4N, with a unique equilibrium. Stability is indicated by the directional arrows in the figures.
Figure 10 shows the possibility of multiple equilibria, but the arrows indicate that the symmetrical
equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium. 
In Appendix D, we show that Firm i's lobbying expenditure in a symmetrical equilibrium is 
y'4(1 + r1.)NV + a 2V' + r1.V- 2(1 + a)N 
(6)
p, = 2(1 +a) 2 ' 
where the e subscript denotes equilibrium. By substituting Equation 6 into the profit Equation 3, we
can express equilibrium firm profit as 
1! II'= [ p, lv- (7)i Pe + a.pe + N Pel 
where p, = pe(V, N, <:1.) for both firms. 
5. Comparative Statics 
We next consider the comparative statics of expenditures and profits with respect to competition. 
First, we show the effect of competition on equilibrium lobbying expenditures. In Appendix Ewe prove
THEOREM I: (I) If V/4 S N, then 8p..f8<:t < 0 at all levels ofr:J. E (0,1]. (2) If V/4 > N, then 8p..f
8<:1. is greater than, equal to, or less than 0 as r:J. is less than, equal to, or greater than (V- 4N)/V or, 
equivalently, as (I - r:J.)V/4 is greater than, equal to, or less than N. 
This suggests that if the value of the rent is sufficiently small relative to N, then equilibrium 
9 These changes in the finn's expenditures are hypothetical, being based on its rival's action. The equilibrium is static, but the 
intuition concerning the shape of the reaction function seems reasonable and lends credence to the model. 
10 We cannot use the e:t>istence and uniqueness proofs from Esteban and Ray (1999), which depend on a thrice continuously 
differentiable, strictly concave cost function. In this section, cost is linear. 
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lobbying expenditures will fall as competition increases, while if V is sufficiently large relative to N, 
then there is a range where N is sufficiently small that equilibrium lobbying expenditures will rise as 
competition increases before they begin to fall at higher levels of competition. In Figure I A, V/4 < N, 
and in Figure IB, (I- rt.)V/4 < N, so the equilibrium would move toward the origin if at increases. In 
these figures, lobbying expenditures are strategic substitutes in the neighborhood of equilibrium. In 
Figure I C, (I - rt.)V/4 > N, where expenditures are strategic complements in the neighborhood of 
equilibrium, the equilibrium would move away from the origin. 
Intuitively, one might expect that as competition increases, so would the equilibrium lobbying 
expenditures. This view finds support in some previous models that rely on the number of firms or 
entry conditions to model competition (Posner 1975; Rogerson 1982; Sun and Ng 1999). Our model, 
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political costs of supplying the rent. Greater competition decreases expenditures if V :0: 4N and for 
lower levels of ot where V > 4N. This result is in line with empirical research in political science, which 
indicates that firms lobby policymakers on issues with a low N, such as requesting a rent that is 
consistent with the officials' ideology and/or constituency interests or has low visibility, and on issues 
over which there is little competition (small ex) (Lowi 1969; Browne 1995; Wolpe and Levine 1996). 
This also reflects the empirical result in economics that campaign contributions are more likely to 
"buy votes" on narrow issues with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs than on broader issues 
(Stratmann !991, 1995). In other words, firms look for issue niches where their rent-seeking activities 
are unlikely to conflict with other firms' activities, and the granting of the good will not offend other 
interests (Evans 1991; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). Finally, this parallels earlier theoretical results 
that the dissipation rate can decrease as the number of firms increases (e.g., Baye, Kovenock and de 
Vries !993). Greater competition causes an increase in spending only when the rent is very valuable 
compared with the political costs involved. 
Next, we consider the effect of competition on expected profits. The envelope theorem is not 
applicable (Nti !997). In Appendix F we show that if Vis sufficiently large relative toN, then EJIIftaex 
is unambiguously negative. Beyond this it becomes difficult to sign EJITj/EJex, but numerous graphs of 
equilibrium profit for many relative values of V and N invariably show the profit to be decreasing in 
0! and strictly convex over 0! E (0, 1]. 11 
6. Dissipation When cr = 1 
In the standard model, underdissipation occurs if cr =I. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1994) 
showed that if cr = I, the equilibrium dissipation rate is V(n- !)In, or simply V{2 in the two-player 
case. In contrast, our model predicts less than 50% dissipation almost everywhere on the best reply 
function. To see this, first note that the two firms' combined lobbying expenditures sum to 
_ _ J4(1 + O!)NV + ex2V2 + O!V- 2(1 + ex)N
2Pr- P,- (!+ex)' , 
so the derivative of the firms' total lobbying expenditures with respect to N is 
8pr 2(1 + ex)V( J4(1 + O!)NV + 0!2V'r 1 -2(! +ex) 
(8)
oN= (1 +ex)2 
The second derivative is obviously negative because N appears only in the inverted radical in the 
numerator of Equation 8, so the derivative is strictly concave in N. Then opy/EJN = 0 (so p reaches 
a maximum) when the numerator equals zero. At this point, N =(I - ex)V/4 :0: 0. 12 
Given the preceding, we prove that total lobbying expenditures are less than V{2 almost 
everywhere. 
THEOREM 2: For any Nand 0!, the firms' total lobbying expenditures, Pr= 2p, are less than V{2 
everywhere except at the point where N = (I - O!)V/4. 
1 1 Nti ( 1997) completely derived comparative statics for a game similar to ours, but he was able to do so because he did not have 
nonmonotonidties in the derivatives of expenditures with respect to the parameters. 
12 To see this. set the numerator of Equation 8 equal to zero and simplify to get \114(1 + r::1.)NV + r::J. 2 V2]---1 1 !2) = I. From this, 
2V2 112 V2 2V2it follows that V = [4(1 + r::L)NV + :t ] ~ = 4(1 +:»:)NV+ r::1. ~ N =(I ~ ~)V/4 ?: 0. 
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20 40 60 80 100 
Note: pr/V is the dissipation rate, and V = 100. Each curve corresponds to a different a. 
Figure 2. Dissipation rate as a function of policymakers' costs for various values of ct. 
PRooF: See Appendix G. 
Thus, firms will spend less than in the standard model except at a point of measure zero. 13 This is 
so for two reasons. First, for N < (1 - '=t)V/4, political costs are low enough that firms do not have to 
spend very much relative to the size of the rent. For N > (I - rx)V/4, rising political costs lower the 
probability of firms being able to gain the rent, thereby causing equilibrium rent dissipation to decrease, 
approaching zero as N ---> V. Figure 2 demonstrates the effects of policymaker costs on dissipation 
under various degrees of competition. Here, V = 100 and the dissipation rate (or Pr/V) is plotted over 
N E (0, V) for selected values of rx. Recall that the standard game is a special case of our model in which 
r:t = I and N ---> 0; at this point in Figure 2 the dissipation rate is 50% and decreases monotonically with 
increases inN. For other values of Cl, the dissipation rate is maximized at 50% at N = (1 ~ ct)V/4. For 
any value of r1., the dissipation rate is less than 30% for about half the range of N E (0, 100). 
These results are highly intuitive. Policymakers with low costs require relatively small rent­
seeking outlays as long as the level of competition is low. As policymakers' costs increase. however, 
so must lobbying. But for sufficiently high policymaker costs, where N 2: (I - rx)V/4, continued 
lobbying efforts become less profitable. Firms' expenditures decline to zero as N ---> V. This reflects 
the property that lobbying a legislator with parliamentary rights over a policy area is worth more than 
lobbying other legislators. Similarly, agents are less likely to lobby policymakers with a predisposition 
against the policy. 




In other words, because Nand V are continuous real variables, the a priori probability of N heing equal to (I - :t)V/4, so finns 
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Unequal benefits would result in unequal profits and expenditures (the finn with the higher valuation 
would spend more). However, this would not damage our qualitative results as long as we change 
Assumption I to 
AssUMPTION 2: min{V., v,} > N. 
7. Cases of cr > 1 and cr > 2: Increasing Returns 
As discussed in Section 2, the case of cr > n/(n - I) drew attention in the literature following 
Tullock ( 1980) because total spending exceeded potential rents. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries ( 1999) 
suggested that spending zero dominates such an equilibrium, and showed that the standard game has 
a pure-strategy equilibrium if and only if cr > n/(n - I). However, overdissipation occurs in mixed 
strategies roughly half the time (Baye. Kovenock, and de Vries 1999). To consider increasing returns 
in the model incorporating politics, we generalize the profit maximization problem to 
n;- R? ]max - ' V-R· where cr > I. 	 (9)R; [Rr + r:tRJ +N ll 
As in previous literature, we restrict attention to cases where cr is an integer. The first-order condition is 
1 2 1 	 1 
8[1. [ crR"- ] [ crR "- ] [cr(ct/1" +N)R"- ]-'= ' V- ' V-1= I ' V-1=0 (10)
8R, Rr + ctRj + N (Rr + ctRj + N) 2 (Rr + ctRj + N) 2 • 
To determine the reaction function, we might rearrange the first-order condition to obtain R; as 
Ill 
Ml·'''. 
a function of Rj. This results, however, in a complicated quartic function. Instead, we prove in 
Appendix H that the first-order condition implicitly defines R, as a function of Rj, except possibly 
at a point of measure zero. 14 This implicit function can conceptually be rearranged to an explicit fonn 
of Finn i's reaction function. A symmetrical equilibrium would require that 
cr(ct/1" +N)R"- 1 ] 
I ' V-1=0 (ll)
[(Rr + ctRj + N)2 
and R1 = R, > 0 with II, = II, 2: 0 	 (12) 
so the firms are maximizing profit (by Eqn. II), where expenditures are positive and profits are 
nonnegative (by Conditions 12). Consider a case where cr=2, n= 2, V= 100, N =25, ex= 1/3, andR1 = 
R2• Figure 3 plots the graph of Equation ll betweenR1=R2 =0 andR1=R,= 100= V. 
15 There is only 
one positive R; where the first-order condition is satisfied and R1 = R2 > 0. Closer inspection reveals 
that the equilibrium R, falls between 38.42 and 38.43. 16 At these values, the expected profits are 27.50 
and 27.49. Thus, Equation ll and Conditions 12 are satisfied, and we have found a symmetrical Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies. In this equilibrium the rent is approximately 76.85% dissipated. 
We perform the same operations for a case where cr=3, n=2, V= 100, N=25, ex= l/4, andR1= 
14 	The Implicit Function Theorem gives sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for a function to exist. Failure of the conditions 
at a single point does not mean that a function carmot exist at that point (Chiang 1984). Moreover. because the theorem fails 
only at a point of measure zero, the function certainly exists around neighborhoods at all other points. 
L'i Recall that finns would certainly spend no more than R1 = R2 = V. 
16 At R1 = 38.42, 8IT,/8R1 = 0.00008, while at R1 = 38.43, 8ITj8R, = --0.00019, so we have found the neighborhood of 
a maximum. 
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Note: on/oR, is the first order condition, which is the implicit reaction function. The symmetric 
equilibrium is found by setting R1 = R2 . 
Figure 3. Determining a symmetric equilibrium when cr = 2, n =2, V = 100, N = 25, and c.~:= 1/3. 
R2. Figure 4 graphs the first-order condition. Here, the equilibrium R, falls between 48.02 and 48.03, 
with corresp9nding profits of 31.97 and 31.96, and the dissipation rate is approximately 96.05%. Thus, 
with policymaker costs and political competition incorporated into the standard game, a symmetrical 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists with underdissipation of rents, even for cr > n/(n- 1). 
8. Conclusion 
The approach outlined here emphasizes the politics involved in rent-seeking games. Adding 
policymaker costs and offering an alternative conceptualization of competition between firms provide 
greater verisimilitude to the political process and a more reasonable approximation to the question of 
how firms allocate resources to rent seeking. 
Intuitively, incorporating politics serves to generalize the standard rent-seeking model. As we 
discussed regarding Equations 1 and 2, the standard model is a special case of our model. 17 
Incorporating policymaker costs (N) and political competition (rx) fundamentally alters the game's 
underlying success probabilities, which changes the way finns behave in the model. This leads to very 
different conclusions regarding lobbying behavior and the social costs of rent seeking. For example, 
our Theorem I indicates that firms will avoid political competition in many cases, rather than spend 
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Note: olli/oR; is the first order condition, which is the implicit reaction Junction. The symmetric 
equilibrium is found by setting R' ~ R, . 
Figure 4. Determining a symmetric equilibrium when cr = 3, n =2, V = 100, N = 25, and r:x = l/4. 
more under greater competition. In fact, our model finds that dissipation rates are generally lower than 
the standard model suggests (Theorem 2), even under increasing returns to rent-seeking expenditures 
as shown in section 7. Much of what has followed Tullock's seminal contribution consists of 
mathematically elegant extensions that generate politically complicated results. The model we 
advance is much simpler. In its results, we see that the political context helps to determine the 
strategies that finns will use, as well as the likely outcomes of rent-seeking expenditures. 
In short, as the policy that embodies the rent is more costly forpolicymakers to pass, ceteris paribus, 
rent seekers are less likely to win the rent and will be less interested in lobbying for it. Rent seekers 
will similarly avoid lobbying where there are intense counteracting efforts from other interests­
expected profits are higher where political competition is lower. In addition, political costs and com­
petition will dissuade rent seekers from spending more to win a prize than the value of the prize itself. 
Appendix A: The Best Reply Functions 
Rearranging Equation 4 yields the profit-maximizing level of R1 as a function of R1and exogenous variables: 
(AI) 
From Equation AI, note that (I) R1 > 0 if R; is sufficiently low that it pays Finn ito lobby; (2) R, =0 at a sufficiently high R1; and 
(3)R, < 0 for even higher R1, which is not feasible because R, 2: 0. We restrict analysis toR;, R12: 0. We next e.<.tablish that the R; 
and R1 intercepts of Equation A I are positive. Then, because Equation At is obviously continuous, we know that the best reply 
function passes through the first quadrant in R, ~ R1 space. It follows that for N E (0, ex;:), there are points of Equation A I at which 
R, and R1 are both positive. From Equation AI, the R, and R1 intercepts are 
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R,IH, -n = v'fliV- N (A2) 
V-N 
and RJIR, (AJ) 
lEMMA AI. The R, and R1 intercepts of Equation AI are positive. Funhennore, the R, intercept is less than the R intercept.1 
PROOF. By Assumption I, V > N, hence ../NV- N > 0. ~otheR, intercept is positive. V- N > 0 and:~: > 0::::} (V- N)Jr:z. > 
O, 50 the R intercept is positive. Because rx E (0, IJ, we have1 
V-N .fMi-N .fMi 
-,~> , 2: -N. QED. 

We next establish Firm i's willingness to invest in lobbying according to Equation 5 in the paper. 

LEMMA A2. Finn i's profit is nonnegative on Equation AI for R, E [0, .,fFiV- N]. 

PRJXJF. Expected profit is 

(A4)n~ [R,+;;,+N]v -R, 
Obviously, if R, = 0, then TI,. = 0. Next, consider R1 E (0, v'NV- N}. Rearranging Equation A4, we see that profit is nonnegative 
if V- r:tR1 - N 2"': R,, which by Equation A I can be expressed as V- ':1Ri - N 2"': R1 = J('1.R + N)V ':1Ri- N. So profit is 1 
nonnegative if 
(AS) 
We complete the proof by showing that Equation A5 holds on Equation A I. The right side of Equation A5 increases in Ri, which 
reaches a maximum of (V- N)h.. in the interval of this lemma. Then, because (V- NR)/11. 2"': Rj. 
J[a(V -N)/a +NJV ~ V 2 J(oR, +N)V. QED. 
Defining the set of R, values that satisfy Equation AI as p1, we have proven 
THEOREM AI. The best reply function of Finn I is 
_ { yl(oR1 +N)V- oR1 - N forO :S R1 :S 7 p,- 0 for(~"-NJ < R , ' 
Appendix B: The Shape of the Best Reply Functions 
We show that p1 is strictly concave over Ri E [0, (V- N)/txj, but that its exact shape depends on the relative magnitudes 
of V and N. Two lemmas prove these conjectures and will be useful later. 
LEMMA B I. Firm i's best reply function is strictly concave over R1 E [0, (V- N)h..]. 
PRooF. The first derivative of p1 with respect toRi is 
(81) 
and the second derivative is therefore 
which is clearly negative. Therefore, p, is strictly concave. QED. 
LEMMA 82. If V :S 4N, then p, is monotonically decreasing over R1 E [0, (V- N)/tx]. If V > 4N, then p, has an interior 
maximum at Ri = (V/4 - N)/a., which is in the interior of [0, (V- N)/Cl]. 
PRooF. The slope of p, is given by Op,J{)Rr Rearranging Equation B I, we ~ee that 
50 Godwin, Lopez, and Seldon 
and 
We are concerned with p, over R1 E [0. (V ~ N)/':1.}. Now V/4 - N < V ~ N, so (V/4- N)fct. < (V- N)/r:J.. Thus, tlle critical point 
R = (V/4- N)/CJ. is less than (V- N)/CJ.. However, if V is small enough that (V/4 - N)/CJ. :::; 0, then R1 cannot be less than (V/4­1 
N)/'l. since R; cannot be negative. ft follows that 8p,/DRJ :::; 0 on R1 E [0, (V- N)/'lj. Note that (V/4- N)/Cl. :::; 0 implies that V::; 
4N. Thus, if V S 4N, then p; is decreasing and strictly concave in Rr However, if V > 4N, then there exists an interior maximwn 
for p, in [0, (V- N)h:J. Because the second derivalive is negative by Lemma Bl, p; reaches a maximum where Ri = (V/4­
N)h.. Hence. if V > 4N, then p, has an interior maximum at R1 = (V/4 - N)/-:1. E (0, (V- N)/".1.). QED. 
Appendix C: Equilibrium 
We must establish the existence of e4uilibria because games with infinite strategy set~ may not have an equilibrium 
(Morrow 1994). We first note the following: (I) the strategy spaceR; E {0, V) fori= I, 2 are compact and convex; (2) the 
expected profit function ll; = [Rj(R, + ':IR1 + N)JV - R, is defined, continuous, and bounded on the strategy sets; and (3) ll1 
is strictly concave in R; because rfnJ(JRf < 0. 
THEOREM Cl. The game has at least one Nash equilibrium. 
PRooF. The profit function is concave, hence it is also quasiconcave. This, together with points (I) and (2) above, satisfies 
the conditions for a well-known existence proof for Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995). QED. 
Thus, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium. However, it is possible that multiple equilibria exist. We therefore 
consider uniqueness. To this end, we eslablish 
THEOREM C2. If V :S 4N, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the game. Furthennore, the equilibrium is symmetric, 
so in equilibrium P; = Pr 
PRooF. By Theorem 3.4 of Friedman (1990), and given points 1 and 2 above, a unique equilibrium exists as long as the 
best reply functions are contractions. In our game, the best reply functions, Equation 5, do not conlain R; on the right side. Thus, 
because the best reply functions are symmetrical, they are contractions if the value of 1Dp;/DR11 for Equation 5 is less than one. 
Suppose V :S 4N, then, by Lemmas Bl and 82, p 1 is monotonically decreasing and strictly concave. Hence, Dpj8Rj :S 





1-a/21 :S 1/2 because a E (0, I], so 0 :S I 8p;/DRj IS l/2 < l, and uniqueness is guaranteed for V ~ 4N. Symmetry of the 
functions implies that the unique equilibrium is where p1 = Pz. QED. 
Uniqueness is not so easy to show in the case where V > 4N because the best reply function is not necessarily 




While we know that the derivative is greater than 0, we have no upper bound for it. Certainly, for some cases the derivative will 
be less than I, but this will not hold with generality. Another well-known uniqueness theorem requires the Jacobian of the best 
reply functions to be negative quasidefinite (e.g., Friedman 1990). However, our best reply functions do not satisfy this condition. 
On the other hand, we can apply the contraction theorem to special cases where V > 4N. We have 
THEOREM C3. If 4 ( 1 ~':~i N > V > 4N, there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the game. The reaction functions are 
symmetrical, so in equilibrium p, = Pi· 
PRooF. This is not a vacuous case, because (I + :x)/ll > I. By Theorem 3.4 of Friedman ( 1990), we must show that the best 
reply function is a contraction. For the decreasing portion of the best reply function, Theorem C2 indicates that I DpJ8Rj I < 1. 
On the increasing portion, 8p;/DR1 ~ 0; and the largest value of Dpj8Ri occurs at R1 = 0, where, by Equation 81, 
Jp, ,JV- < ___ , 
8R1- 2VN . 
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2(1 +>).JN 
>~ "'.1. = !.
2.,!N 
Thus, on the upward ~loping portion of p,. 0 ::; Dpj0R1 < I. so the best reply function is a contmction. Therefore, IOp,!UR j < I 
1
for this function under the condition of this theorem, so there is a unique equilibrium. Symmetry of best reply functions implies 
p,~ Pr QED. 

We do not prove uniqueness if V > 4 ( 1 ; 1 ) 2N. but the only stable equilibrium is symmetrical (see text). 

Appendix D: Equilibrium Lobbying Expenditures 
We detennine the optimal investment at the symmetrical equilibrium. Let p, = p = p,, so p, satisfies 
1 
Rearranging tenns, we get (I + "'...)Pe + N = .j("'...Pe + N)V or 
(I+ "'.1.} 
2 
p; + 2(1 + "'...)Np~ + N2 = ("'...p€ + N}V = 'Xp~V +NV. 

From the quadratic equation. 

>V- 2(1 + >)N"' Vf2(1 + >)N - >V]'- 4( I + >)'(N'- VN) 
P, = 2(1 + "'.1./ ' 
where it can be shown that 
2




>V- 2(1 + >)N c'c J>'V' + 4(1 + cr)NV 
p, -· 2(1 +>)' . 
1The sign of the tenn under the radical is greater than rx V1 • so we disregard the solution where the radical is subtracted because 
it would yield a negative Pe. and we are [eft with Equation 6 in the text. 
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 1 
To analyze the effect of competition on equilibrium lobbying expenditures, we take the derivative of Equation 6 with 

respect to (X_ After considerable manipulation, we find that 

Dp, [2(1 + cr)N +(I- >JVJ[ Jcr'V' +4(1 + >)VN] + cr(l- cr)V'- 6(1 + cr)VN 
Dr:~. 2(1 +r:~.) 3 y'-:x2 V2 +4(1 +':X)VN 
In the following, we concentrate on the numerator because the denominator is positive under our assumptions. Recall, in what 
follows, that 'l: E (0,1 ]. Define the numerator as n. 
LEMMA E I. If tl = I, then 8pj8Cl < 0. 
PRooF. Suppose 1::J. = I, then Q = 4N JV2 + 8VN - 12VN. Became N < V by Assumption I, 
4N-/V2 + 8VN- 12VN < 4N/V2 +8V2- 12VN = 4N.J9V2- 12VN = l2VN- 12VN = 0. 
Because the denominator of Dp~/Dr:~. is positive, iJpjO"'... < 0. QED. 
LEMMA E2. As "'.1.---->0f-, Dpe/0":1. approaches (1) a positive limit if and only if V/4 > N; (2) zero if and only if V/4 =N; and (3) 
a negative limit if and only if V/4 < N. 
PRooF. To prove statemen! I of Lemma E2, we show that n > 0 {::} V/4 > N. In doing this, we prove statement 2 by an 
intennediate result that Q = 0 ¢:} V/4 = N. Suppose 'X---->0+, then Q approaches [V + 2NJ(/4VNJ- 6VN, and 
52 Godwin, Lopez, and Seldon 
) 
Divide both sides of the inequality by V + 2N > 0 to see that the latter holds if and only if 
6VN 	 36V2N 2 
,....-,.,4VN > -- # 	 4VN > 
V'+VIV V+2N (V+2Nf V2 +4VN +4N2 
Divide through the last inequality by 4VN and rearrange tenns to get 
V 2 + 4VN + 4N2 > 9VN <=> V2 - 5VN + 4N2 > 0. 
The last quadratic equation is strictly convex, so the solutions to the inequality for N lie outside the solutions of the quadratic 
equality. The solutions are V =Nand V/4 = N. Because V > N by Assumption 1. we have proved statement 2 of the lemma: 
8pj& =0 if and only if V/4=N. Continuing the proof of statement 1, either V <Nor V/4 > N. Again, the fanner is contrary to 
Assumption I, so 8pj{)a.. > 0 if and only if V/4 > N. Similar reasoning proves that, because V > N by assumption, 8pjlkt < 0 if 
and only if V/4 < N. QED. 
Lemma E2 states that 8pj00 approaches zero if V/4 = N, but it will not equal zero because IX > 0. 
LEMMA E3. 8pj8a. = 0 if and only if 01 = (V- 4N)/V ~ N = (l - 'l:)V/4. 
PROOF. Because N =(1 - >:~)V/4 <=> 4N/V = I -IX< 1, such an Cl exists if and only if V > 4N. We show that the only 
solution for !l = 0 under our assumptions occurs where N =(I - IX)V/N <=>IX= (V- 4N)/V. Thus, 
[(I ~ a)V + 2(1 + a)N] [va'V' + 4(1 + a)VN] +a( I ~ a)V' ~ 6(1 + a)VN ~ 0 
<> [(I~ a)V + 2(1 + a)N[ [ va'V' + 4(1 + a)VN] ~~a(I~ o)V' + 6(1 + o)VN. 
Squaring both sides of the last equation and expanding the terms yields 
a'( I ~ a)'V' + 4a'( I + a)(l ~ a)V'N + 4a' (I +a)' V'N' + 4( I + a)(l ~ a)'V'N 
+ 16(1 + a) 2(1 ~ o)V'N' + 16(1 + a) 2VN3 
~a'( I~ a)'V' ~ 12a(l +a)( I~ o)V3N + 36(1 + a)2V2N'. 
2I 	 Subtracting et: ( l - 1X) 2V" from both sides of the equality, dividing by (I + IX)VN, and then subtracting the right side from both 
sides and simplifying, we get 
(I ~a)V' +(a~ 5)NV +4N' ~o. 
Solving the quadratic equation for N, we find that N =(I - ll)V/4 or N = V. The latter contradicts Assumption I, soN= 
(I ~ a)V/4. QED. 
We now proceed to the proof of 
THEOREM I. (I) If V/4 :::; N, then [)pJOIX < 0 at all levels of IX E (0,1 J. (2) If V/4 > N, then [)pJf:Ja is greater than, equal to, 
or Jess than 0 as o: is less than, equal to, or greater than (V- 4N)/V or, equivalently, as (I - IX)V/4 is greater than, equal to, 
or less than N. 
PRooF. (1) Suppose V/4:::; N. By Lemma El, 8pJ8r:~.jrx= 1 < 0; and by Lemma E2, V/4:::; N-=* lifna:~fr+ {)peff:Ja S 0. By 
Lemma E3, {)pJ81X=O <=> IX=(V- 4N)/V <=> N =(1 - IX)V/4. But by the assumption of part 1 of Theorem I, N?: V/4 >(I- a)V/ 
4, so 8pJOO =f- 0 in the interior of IX E (0,11 if V/4 :$ N. Therefore, if V/4 :S N, the derivative is never so high as 0. The derivative 
is obviously continuous, so if V/4 ;::; N, then {)pJOIX < OV' IX E (0,1]. (2) Suppose V/4 > N. By Lemma El, 8pJ8a:!rx=1 < 0, and 
by Lemma E2. V/4 > N '* li~--->0+ 8pef8a. > 0. If V/4 > N, there exists an a E {0,1] such that V/4 >(I- a)V/4 > N by the 
continuity of IX. Hence, if V/4 > N, then 8p..J81X is greater than, equal to, or less than 0 as IX is less than, equal to, or greater than 
(V- 4N)/V, or equivalently, as (I - o:)V/4 is greater than, equal to, or less than N. QED. 
Appendix F: The Effect of Increasing Competition on Profit 
Denoting p..(V, N, IX) as Pe(IX), the derivative of Equation 7 with respect to IX is 
am~ p;(a) [( N ) V ~ I] + ~[p,(a)j'V '. 
iJa [p,(a) + ap,(a) +NJ' [p,(a) + ap,(a) + Nj 
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The second tt•nn i~ obviou-;1) negative. Because the lirst-order condition (&_jn. -1-J holds for any R, and R;. including R;-= R; = 
f\·l':ll. and ~cause :tpe(::t) .> 0, ~Ne can ~ign the temt in braces as 
Then the first tennis positive. zero, or negative as p;.('l) is negative, zero, or positive. Thu~. if~· is sufficiently large relative 
10 N. then iJII;"/ih is unambiguously negative, but generally the sign will depend on the values of the parameter. 
Appendix G: Proof of Theorem 2 
PRooF. Let 'l E (0, I] and, by Assumption l and nonnegarive political costs, N E (0, V). Recall that PT is maximized 
at the single point where N = (I -· 'l)V/4. Therefore. 
\/4(1 +-:t)NV + ':l2 V:' + -:lV · 2(1 + ':l)N
P1 = 2p, = , ___::.:.:____cc_ 

(I -1-'l)­
V(4/4)11 +~>JV' + >'V' + >V- (2/4)(1 + >)(1- >)V
< ' 
- (I + 'Lt 
IV'+ >f'- (1 + >)(1- >JV/2 (1 +>JV- (1 + >)(1- >JV/2 v 
(I +'LJ" (I+ :1)2 2 
Because the first derivative is striclly concave, the equality holds only at the point where N =(I - 'l)V/4; elsewhere PT < vn. 
Therefore. total lobbying expendimres are less than one half of the value of benefits almost everywhere. QED. 
Appendix H: The Implicit Reaction Function 
We prove that the first-order condition is an implicit function R, = R,(R1), except possibly at a point of measure zero 
using the Implicit Function Theorem. We first establish two lemmas where we define 
cr(>i?? + N)R"-']lJI(R,R)~ - J I V-I.1 [ (R~ + ":1R.1 " + N) 2 
LEMMA Hl. The derivatives iJ'P!iJR, and 8lf'/DR1 are continuous everywhere. 
PJHX)F. We prove the lemma for (}'¥/DR,, then it will hold for Ol:fi/DRj. Note that 
Becau~ N is positive, these tenns obviously are continuous everywhere. QED. 
LE.'AMA H2. If l¥(R,.. R1) = 0, D'P/iJR, -I- 0 except at a point of measure zero. 
We can rewrite Dl:fJ/fJR, of Lemma Hi as 
iJ'P 2crR"- 1 (cr- 1)(>1?," +N)- (1 + cr)R: 
DR= (cr-I)R,-1- (R" +~ +N) R,(R'; +>Rj + N)
' ' ' 
Thi~ derivative i~ nonzero except at (a ~ I )('l/?1 " +N) =-(I + a)R';', a point of mea.<;ure zero on R,. QED. 
The existence of this point where ()'P!fJR; = 0 does not necessarily mean that the function does not exist at this point, 
because the Implicit Function Theorem establishes sufficient, not necessary, conditions. It is possible for this condition to fail at 
a point where a function exists (Chiang 1984). 
With the'>e two lemma<;, we can prove 
THEOREM HI. The first-order condition 10 implicitly defines a function R,"" .P(R1), except possibly at a point of measure zero. 
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PROOF. In our case, the Implicit Function Theorem states that (I) if 8'1'18R; and IJ'f!/8R1 are continuous; and (2) if. at the 
point where 'P(R;, R) = 0, 8'¥/fJR; is nonzero, then '¥(R;, Rj) defines an implicit function in neighborhoods around points where 
these conditions hold. QED. 
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